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The California Resale Royalty Act:
Droit de [not so] Suite
by EMILY ESCHENBACH BARKER*

Introduction
It is a generally accepted principal that an artist owns certain
rights to exploit the economic value of his works. In the United
States, an artist's rights are protected by various provisions of federal
copyright law.' These pecuniary rights exist largely in the same form
across the globe, however, some countries, and now the state of
California, have begun to recognize personal rights of artists in their
work.2 These moral rights, or droit moral, are retained by the artist
even after a work is sold.! The particular moral right this paper is
concerned with, is the droit de suite or "art proceeds right."' The droit
de suite grants artists the right to receive royalties based on the resale

* The author is a graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, and currently serving as Law Clerk to Chief Justice Reiber of the Vermont Supreme
Court. I would like to thank Judge and Mrs. Bea, along with their son Nick, for their
consistent support of my legal pursuits, and Paolo luliano for his support in everything
else. A special thanks to Professor Calvin Massey and Denise Alter, who were invaluable
resources throughout this project.
1. See United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. III 1979)
("Copyright Act").
2. See e.g., The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Text, July 24, 1971), reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 27
(1981); Universal Copyright Convention (Paris Text, July 24, 1971), reprinted in NIMMER,
supra, at app. 25; see also California Resale Royalty Act of 1976, Cal. Civ. Code § 986
(1976).
3. See Peter E. Berlowe, Laura J. Berlowe-Heinish, & Peter A. Koziol, In this Digital
Age, Are We Protecting Tomorrow's 'Masterpieces'?Protection of the Moral Rights of the
DigitalGraphic Artist, 81 FLA. B.J. 30 (2007).
4. Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit De Suite and a
ProposedEnactmentfor the United States, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 19, 22 n.13 (1966).
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of their work.' It is the proposition of this paper that California's
statutory version of droit de suite, California Civil Code Section 986'
("Resale Royalty Act"), effects a Fifth Amendment taking of private
property and thus, at a minimum, requires just compensation.7 It is
questionable whether this taking is for a public use, in which case,
even just compensation would not cure its constitutional deficiencies.

I.

History of Droit de Suite

The droit de suite was first proposed in Europe around 1893, in
response to a decrease in the importance of the salon, the end of the
private patron, and to champion the cause of the "starving artist."8 In
the early 1920s newspapers ran stories of widows to famous artists
selling flowers in the streets to survive, while their dead husband's
works sold for exponentially higher and higher prices in luxe parisian
galleries.! The image of the starving artist is heavily engrained in the
collective consciousness of Western society-being portrayed in
everything from Puccini's La Boheme to the modern musical Rent. 0

5. See Directive 2001/84/, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 4 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l272/1_27220011013enOO320036.pdf.
6. California Resale Royalty Act of 1976, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (1976) [hereinafter
Resale Royalty Act].
(a) Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in California or the sale
takes place in California, the seller or the seller's agent shall pay to the artist of such
work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale. The
right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of such sale
may be waived only by a contract in writing providing for an amount in excess of 5
percent of the amount of such sale. An artist may assign the right to collect the
royalty payment provided by this section to another individual or entity. However,
the assignment shall not have the effect of creating a waiver prohibited by this
subdivision[.]
7. The Resale Royalty Act has not been challenged on Fifth Amendment takings
grounds. It has, however, been challenged and upheld in the Ninth Circuit based on the
Due Process and Contracts Clauses of the United States Constitution, see Morseburg v.
Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980) (ruling that the California Resale Royalties Act did
not preempt the Copyright Act of 1909 because there were no federal laws that addressed
the issue and the resale royalty did not impermissibly restrict transfer of the art).
8. Rita E Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the
UnderprivilegedArtist Under Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 13-14
(1962).
9. Id.
10. See generally Jane C. Lee, Upstaging the Playwright: The Joint Authorship
Entanglement Between Dramaturgsand Playwrights, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 75 (1988).
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This trope was a driving force behind creation of the droit de suite
statutes in Europe, which in turn inspired the California law.n
II. California's Droite de Suite Statute
California's droite de suite statute, the California Resale Royalty
Act, was enacted in 1976.1' It applies to all works of fine art resold in
California, or resold anywhere by a California resident, for a gross
sale of $1,000 or more." It mandates a five-percent royalty on the
resale price of any work of fine art. An artist may only waive this
right "by a contract in writing providing for an amount in excess of
five-percent of the amount of such sale."14 In other words, the fivepercent royalty is not truly waivable in any sense; this provision
merely restates the pre-existing right of a person to contract for a
royalty percentage greater than the statutory minimum. The artist
may assign the right to collect, but the assignment cannot have the
effect of waiver of the mandatory five-percent"-that is, the artist
cannot assign the collection right to the purchaser, for in that case the
five-percent is, of course, effectively waived.
III. Takings Under the Fifth Amendment
Although both the federal government and the states have the
power of eminent domain-the authority to take private property
when necessary for legitimate government public use-the
Constitution contains a very important limit on this power. The Fifth
Amendment declares in part: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."" The Takings clause is the
most important protection of property rights in the Constitution and
was the first amendment in the Bill of Rights to be applied to the
states."
One of the bases for the clause is the principle that the
government should not confiscate the property of some to give it to

11. See Godfrey Barker, Let Their Tiny Hands Freeze, TIMES (London), Jan. 6, 2006,
at 20, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/thunderer/article785496.ece.
12. Resale Royalty Act, supra note 6.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a), (b)(2) (2010).
14. Resale Royalty Act, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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others. Another basis is the belief that when the government takes
away one person's property to benefit society, society should pay for
the benefit conferred. The Supreme Court has explained that a
principal purpose of the Takings Clause is to "bar the Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 9 The
California law does not comport with either of these ideals; the state
is confiscating the property of some and giving it to others with the
policy goal of redistributing wealth from the rich to the "poor." It
does this under the apparent auspices of attempting to benefit society
by investing in the arts, however, it has mandated that individuals,
rather than society as a whole, pay for this benefit.20
A takings clause analysis is comprised of essentially four
sequential questions: (1) was there a "taking?"; (2) is the thing taken
private property?; if so, (3) was the property taken for a public use?;
and, if so (4) was "just compensation" paid?2' Though these prongs
provide helpful guidelines, they by no means constitute a bright-line
test. The Supreme Court has admitted that it "has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness'
require the economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government."2 2 This "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" turns "upon
the particular circumstances in [each] case." 23
A.

Has a 'Taking' Occurred?

The threshold question of whether particular actions amount to a
taking has traditionally been one of the most heavily litigated prongs
in any takings analysis.24 When performing these analyses, courts
generally designate the government action as belonging under one of
two categories: either a regulatory taking or a possessory taking.25 A
"possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or

18. See Frank Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1097 (1981).

19. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
20. The Resale Royalty Act contains no legislative history or guidance as to the
purposes of its enactment.
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 640
(6th ed. 2006).
22. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
23.

Id.

24. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 21, at 641.
25. Id.
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physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economic use of the
property.2 Which category is designated will change the tests applied,
however, the Supreme Court has not always been clear as to the
particular definitions of these terms, and sometimes has blurred their
distinctions.'
The Resale Royalty Act falls squarely under the rubric of a
"possessory" taking because it effects a confiscation and permanent
dispossession of the property, as opposed to a regulation that merely
restricts the owner's use. Expropriation of property in this manner is
the paradigmatic example of a classic taking.29 In Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,30 the Supreme Court found a taking
when the state government took the interest accruing on an
interpleader account."' In that case, a Florida statute provided that
whenever a contested sum of money was deposited with the court, the
interest on the account would become the property of the
government.3 The deposited funds in that case were the amount
received as the purchase price for Webb's assets.33 The Supreme
Court found that this property was "held only for the ultimate benefit
of Webb's creditors, not for the benefit of the court and not for the
benefit of the county."34 The Court held that this was a classic taking
because the government's actions amounted to an expropriation of
private property." In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
"[i]t is true, of course, that none of the creditor claimants had any
right to the deposited funds until their claims were recognized and
distribution was ordered." 6 However, "[t]hat lack of immediate
26

26. Id. at 640.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 641.
29. See, e.g., Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878), abrogated by TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427
(1981) ("When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation
of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking.").
30. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
31. An interpleader account is a sum of money deposited with a court when parties
have competing claims for the sum.
32. Webb, 449 U.S. at 155.
33. Id. at 161.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 161-62 (citations omitted).
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right .. . does not automatically bar a claimant ultimately determined
to be entitled to all or a share of the fund from claiming a proper
share of the interest, the fruit of the fund's use, that is realized in the
interim."" Thus, the Court found a taking had occurred despite the
fact that the government had, in a sense, created the asset ex nihilo,
and merely kept its creation. The reasoning is that the government
had "earned" money on an account it did not own, the ownership
right to earn that money did not belong to the government, and use of
that right, even for a brief time amounted to an expropriation from
the rightful owner, whoever that turned out to be. The government
"may not transform private property into public property without
compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court.

This is the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was meant to prevent.",8
The Resale Royalty Act goes even further than the law at issue
in Webb. The mandatory payment under the California law
permanently dispossesses the owner of his property. It matters not
that the money taken by the California statute is given to a private
party rather than the California government; the state-enacted statute
effects the confiscation. For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, the Supreme Court found that there was a taking when the
government required a private waterway be opened for public use."
In that case, the owners of a pond in Hawaii had spent a substantial
amount of money to dig a channel connecting it to the Pacific Ocean.4
The United States Corps of Engineers deemed their channel
"navigable water" and thus open to use by the general public. 4' The
Court held this was a taking because the government was, in essence,
allowing the public to occupy the property.42
It is important to point out that the Resale Royalty Act
mandates a transfer of five-percent of the sale price, not the profit.43
Thus the amount taken could in fact be a confiscation of the entire
profit at the point of sale. Once the artwork is sold, the only property
interest held by the seller is his profit. This law thus creates the
possibility of the entire profit, and thus entire property interest, being
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 164; accord Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998).
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 179-80.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (2010).
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expropriated. It even creates the possibility of the owner of the
painting owing the artist more than he has made on the transaction.
Although the statute applies only to sales where the gross sales price
is more than the purchase price," any sale for less than five-percent
above the purchase price will create the scenario in which the seller is
forced to pay out more money than he has earned. The statute also
fails to take into account the fact that most galleries must pay to
promote their artists and rent gallery space for the work's exhibition.
When one considers the costs of individual-artist promotion along
with the other overhead costs incurred by sellers in the secondary
market and adds to these the necessity created by the Resale Royalty
Act of paying the artist five-percent of the gross sales price, it
becomes apparent that, generally, a seller must sell a work for
substantially more than a five-percent gross profit to make any
reasonable gain.
In reality though, the amount taken is of little moment. The
Supreme Court has made clear that when property is confiscated or
occupied, the government action will amount to a taking no matter
how small the amount of property involved.45 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., for example, the Supreme

Court found a taking where a city ordinance required apartment
building owners to make space for cable boxes, even though the
amount of space involved was only about one cubic foot.46
Thus under both the classic and current conceptions of takings
jurisprudence, the California statute that requires the owner of a
piece of artwork to part with five-percent of the sale price effects a
taking of private property because it effects a permanent
dispossession of that property.
B. Could the Resale Royalty Act Be Considered a Tax?

Another way that may be helpful to look at this mandated
payment, and see it for the taking it is, is to demonstrate what it is
not: It is not a valid tax. This discussion section will set aside, for the
sake of argument, the fact that the payment mandated by the Resale
Royalty Act is a forced transfer between two private parties, rather
than a payment to the government.47 If it would be constitutional for
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b)(4) (2010).
45. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
46. Id. at 430.
47. This would seem to demonstrate in and of itself that this law is not effectuating
what we generally think of as a tax.
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the government to require this payment be made to the state and the
state to then pay it to the individual artists, the argument could be
made that this is enough like a tax to evade a takings clause analysis.
Thus it is worth discussing.
A tax is a taking and a large body of scholarship has developed
attempting to resolve the inherent conflict of a Constitution that
contains both the power to tax and the limitation of the Fifth
Amendment's takings clause. In short, the consensus of all this
scholarship is that there is no definitive answer as to where one
should draw the line between taxes and takings. "[T]he boundary
between taxation and taking [is] none-too-clear."' Examples that fall
far to one side or the other on the spectrum of tax to taking are
simpler to designate. Professor Calvin Massey has explained that
"[s]urely an income tax of 100% imposed on a single individual-for
example, Bill Gates-would violate the Takings Clause. If that is so,
then the problem becomes a matter of degree."49
Some scholars take this proposition even further, finding many
forms of taxation to be takings. Richard Epstein argues that the
United States government's progressive income tax structure violates
the takings clause." He maintains that imposing higher rates on
higher incomes takes the property of the top earners at a
disproportionate rate. According to Epstein, only a "flat tax" will
satisfy the takings clause."
To be sure, a tax like the Bill Gates tax example, singling out one
or a handful of citizens, would be impermissible.52 The takings clause
is designed to "bar the Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."" But whether Epstein is correct in
carrying the line so far is disputable.' Essentially, no one has yet
48. Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 85, 86 (1996).
49. Id. at 104.
50. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 297-300 (1985).

51. Id.
52. Note that this may also be an impermissible bill of attainder, but I will leave that
question for another article, or for an enterprising law student searching for a note topic.
53. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
54. See e.g., Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and ConstitutionalSerendipity, 41
U. MIAMI L. REV. 223 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's position); William W. Fisher III, The
Significance of PublicPerceptionsof the Takings Doctrine,88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774 (1988)
(same).
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managed a coherent theory of the relationship between taxes and
takings.
Under the classic view of this conundrum, courts looked to how
much a person paid in comparison with how much they received and
focused on the breadth of the burdens imposed." Courts treated
taxes and takings as structurally similar, recognizing that both are
exercises of the sovereign power over individual property, and both
require the individual to receive some equivalent contribution.56
The right of taxation and the right of eminent domain rest
substantially on the same foundation. Compensation is made
when private property is taken in either way. Money is
property. Taxation takes it for public use; and the taxpayer
receives, or is supposed to receive his just compensation in the
protection which government affords to his life, liberty and
property, and in the increase of the value of his possessions by
the use to which the government applies the money raised by
the tax. When private property is taken by right of eminent
domain, special compensation is made.
Thus, under the classic view, both taxes and takings require
compensation. While the compensation required by a taking is
explicit, the compensation required for taxes is the government's
implicit promise to "spend tax revenues on projects benefitting most
if not all citizens."" "No taxation without representation" may sum
up well the founding father's resolution of this inherent conflict; the
compensation for taxation is representation. That is to say that both
taxes and takings require compensation, but where takings are
compensated explicitly, taxes are compensated implicitly.
The Resale Royalty Act does not comport with the classic
conception of a tax; it is not written as a broad "tax" to benefit some
general fund, or a fund for artists generally. What is more, it is
exacted upon a small and ascertainable group of people, and only that
group of people. It does not benefit the larger arts community. Droit
de suite statutes are intended to allow artists to realize the rewards of
their fame. The California Statute is written as a person-to-person
transfer because the interest it is meant to protect-the artist's ability

55. Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous
Burdens Principle,and Its BroaderApplication, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 189, 200 (2002).
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 422 (1851)).
58. Id.
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to cash in on his fame-is personal to the individual; not all artists will
become famous. This is not the type of exaction that falls under the
rubric of a tax. It is a governmentally mandated private person to
private person transfer, in which one person bears the burdens and
most citizens receive no benefit. It is exactly the kind of wealth
redistribution feared by the founding fathers when they wrote the
takings clause into the Constitution.
Just how un-tax-like this law is can be seen by a simple exercise.
If the California government had written a statute requiring the seller
to pay the state a percentage of his profit (as opposed to a percentage
of the sale price, which creates its own problems), and the state then
placed this in a fund for the benefit of the arts, the statute would
almost certainly be a valid exercise of the taxation power. If instead
the government said that it would take this percentage to fund one
specific arts charity, the law would start looking a bit less like a tax,
but likely would still not be a taking. If, on the other hand, the statute
said the government would collect this tax and distribute it to the
individual artists, it would stop looking like a tax and begin to much
more closely resemble a taking. Finally, if we look to the California
Resale Royalty Act, noting it requires no payment to the government,
but rather a payment from private party to private party,5 9 for the
benefit of a particular person only, and that the percentage exacted is
a percentage of the sale price (which may be 100% of the profit and
thus a perfect example of the aforementioned "Bill Gates tax"), then
it becomes very plain that this is not a tax and cannot be saved from a
takings clause analysis.
A more recent theory of the difference between taxes and
takings was expressed by the Supreme Court in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,' but does not appear to have any precedential history before
that case." Under this theory, the takings clause applies only to
59. The Supreme Court has actually alluded to the difference between private party
transfers and payment to the states in its dicta. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If the [Takings Clause] applies when the government
simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to
pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?").
60. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 498.
61. Thomas W. Merril, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 903 (2000) ("The Breyer/Kennedy argument as to why no takings property was
implicated by the Coal Act [in Eastern Enterprises] was a novel one, in the sense that
neither Justice was able to cite any legal authority in support of his thesis."); Kades, supra
note 55, at 193 (quoting WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE ANATOMY OF
JUSTICE IN TAXATION 4 (Univ. of Chicago Law School, Occasional Papers, 1973) ("The

idea that taxes and takings can be distinguished, by defining taxes as general obligations
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deprivations of "identified property interests," or to "specific
interests in physical or intellectual property."6 2 The California statute
is directed at taking a portion of the specific asset from its owner at
the point of sale. It matters not that the asset has been liquidated;
liquidity is not coextensive with fungibility. At the point of
assessment of the five-percent royalty, the now liquid asset has not
become fungible with all other assets, or no assessment could be
made. The percentage payment requirement is entirely dependent
upon that amount of money retaining its quality as a portion of the
sold artwork, as retaining its "tie" to the artist. The California statute
attempts to exact a portion of the seller's specific interest in the value
of his artwork and thus the Resale Royalty Act would not fall under
this newer tax rubric either.
C. Is the Five-Percent Interest Property?
As this is a taking (and not a permissible tax), the next question
under a takings analysis is whether it is property. By its terms, the

takings clause applies only if a court concludes "property" has been
taken by the government. For this reason, a preliminary question in
any takings clause analysis is whether the plaintiff had a property
interest protected by the Fifth Amendment." The scope of the
property interest must be clearly understood in a takings analysis,
because governmental limitations on property rights are permissible
only if those limitations "inhere in the title itself."' The existence of
such a property interest is determined by reference to "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.""

The California Constitution, like the federal Constitution,
contains language that requires the government to compensate
property owners if it effectuates a taking of private property. The
and takings as deprivations of specific assets, is of very recent origin. Blum and Kalven
apparently were the first to consider this distinction" and even "[t]hey realized the
problems inherent in such a formal distinction: 'But [this rule] may on occasion fail to
keep taxation and confiscation clearly apart. Taxes can be set so high that the taxpayer is
forced to dispose of specific property or simply turn it over to the government in order to
satisfy his tax obligation. This perception is at the core of the notion of confiscatory
taxation. Indeed, revolutionary regimes have sometimes used the format of 100 percent
taxation as the very vehicle for confiscation."')).
62. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554.
63. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984).
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
65. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

398

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 38:2

California Constitution states that "[p]rivate property may be taken
or damaged for a public use ... only when just compensation... has
first been paid to, or into court for, the owner."' Note that the
California Constitution includes a requirement of compensation not
only when property is taken but also when it is damaged. The
language "or damaged" was not within California's original
Constitution.' It was added by the legislature at the Constitutional
Convention of 1878-1879 to create an additional remedy which would
"superadd to the guaranty found in the former constitution of this
state ... a guaranty against damage where none previously existed." 8
Courts have thus recognized that, as a general matter, the California
provision "'protects a somewhat broader range of property values'
than does the corresponding federal provision."" These courts have
noted that to hold otherwise would be to reduce the scope of the
provision to its 1849 form, rendering superfluous the addition of the
words "or damaged.". Thus the definition of what can amount to a
taking in California is exceedingly broad.
The definition of what constitutes property in California is
likewise very broad. Under the California Civil Code, property is
defined as "a thing" that it is "the right of one or more persons to
possess" and "use to the exclusion of others."" Property that is not
land, not affixed to the land, not incidental or appurtenant to the
land, or not immovable by law72 is defined to be "personal"-that is to
say, not "real"-property." The artwork targeted by the Resale
Royalty Act is personal property by this definition.
This broad statutory definition of what constitutes personal
property has been affirmed in the courts. For example, the California
Supreme Court has cited with approval another more descriptive,

66. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a) (emphasis added).
67. Id. The California Constitution of 1849 originally only required compensation
when property was taken, but a constitutional amendment adopted in 1879 extended the
right of compensation to damaged property. See Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 10
Cal. 4th 368, 378-79 (1995).
68. Reardon v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 505 (1885).
69. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 664
(2002) (quoting Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 9, n.4 (1994)) (citations omitted);
see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal. 3d 285, 298 (1977).
70. Reardon, 66 Cal. at 501.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (2009).
72. Id. at § 658; see also id. at §H 659, 660, 662.
73. Id. at § 663.
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though still all-encompassing, description of what constitutes property
in California:
The term "property" is sufficiently comprehensive to include
every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which
one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every
species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such
upon which it is practicable to place a money value. As applied
to lands the term comprehends every species of title, inchoate
or complete. It is supposed to embrace those rights which lie in
contract-those which are executor as well as those which are
executed.74
Thus under California case law, the definition of property is very
broad. Unlike the corresponding provision in the United States
Constitution, the California Constitution requires just compensation
not only for a dispossession but also for damage to property. Of
course, it also includes traditionally crucial rights, such as the right to
Transferability is generally
exclude and the right to transfer."
considered to be one of the most valuable "stick[s] in the bundle" of
property rights, and unlawful conditions that restrain alienation will
be found "when repugnant to the interest created."" In upholding
these key hallmarks of property, California law voids unreasonable
restraints on the alienation of property.
The artwork targeted by the Resale Royalty Act is property
under the broad California definition. Fee simple ownership of that
property entitles the owner to all traditionally crucial ownership
rights, such as excludability and transferability. Exaction or damage
one of these property rights effects a taking under California law,
unless the thing taken was never the owner's to begin with-i.e., the
right of the state to take it inhered in its title.
The California Resale Royalty Act mandates the payment of a
five-percent royalty to the artist on resale of the piece, whether or not
this five-percent royalty inheres in the owner's title. That is, it creates
the possibility that a seller who purchases artwork in fee simple will
be dispossessed of a portion of his title. Most likely, a piece of
artwork purchased from an artist in California, after enactment of the
California Resale Act, was purchased subject to the artist's
74.
75.
76.
77.

Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 523 (1929).
See, e.g., Yuba River Power Co., 207 Cal. at 523.
CAL CIV. CODE § 711 (2009).
Id.
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mandatory five-percent royalties; i.e., not in fee simple. In this
limited circumstance, it can be said that the five-percent royalty right
inheres in the title at purchase. As a person cannot sell more than he
owns, every resale would be less than fee simple and subject to the
inherent five-percent royalty. Thus in those limited circumstances,
the mandatory five-percent royalty would inhere in the title and the
Resale Royalty Act would not effect a taking. However, for the vast
majority of transactions, this will not be the case. For example, if an
alien" seller, who purchased his artwork outside of California, sells
his fee simple interest in California, the California government cannot
force the seller to pay a five-percent royalty to the artist without
effecting a taking because the five-percent royalty did not inhere in
his title." Even a California resident who purchased his painting in
California could become subject to a taking if his purchase of the
work occurred prior to the law's enactment. In that case, the owner
would have purchased in fee simple, and the five-percent royalty
would not have inhered in his title. People who move to California
with their art collections and then become California residents also
face the possibility of a taking. They too acquired title in fee simple
and thus this five-percent royalty did not inhere in their titles.
Despite this, they will be required to pay the royalty upon resale
anywhere.? Therefore, although the law is not unconstitutional on its
face, it is unconstitutional as applied in a majority of instances
because it expropriates or damages an owner's vested property
interests.
D.

Is It for Public Use?

The government only has the power to take private property
under the Fifth Amendment when it does so for "public use."" If the
taking is found to be for private use, it is invalidated and the
government must return the property to the owner.2 The Supreme
Court has long held that "one person's property may not be taken for

78. The term "alien" as used here means any seller that is not located in, or a resident
of, California.
79. The fact that this law may inhibit movement of artwork into and out of California
may even raise dormant commerce clause concerns, but that is an issue for another paper.
80. If this law were more uniformly enforced, it is likely that people with large art
collections would choose not to domicile in California. This could cost the state millions in
income taxes.
81. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 662.
82. Id.
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the benefit of another person without justifying public purpose, even
though compensation be paid."83 The "framers' obvious concern was
that the government might use its eminent domain power to play
Robin Hood and take from some private owners and give to others."'
The California Resale Act effects precisely the type of social
judgment and expropriation that the framers intended to prevent
The California
through enactment of the Fifth Amendment.
government has chosen to play Robin Hood, taking property from
the "rich" art seller to give it to the "poor" artist, and it has done so
on an individualized basis. This is not in any sense a public use of this
property. Thomas Cooley explained the basis of the power of
government to take property in his seminal treatise:
When property is appropriated under the right of eminent
domain, a particular item or parcel is taken, because for public
purposes there is a special need of it, and the state takes it
under proceedings which amount, so far as the owner is
concerned, to a forced sale.
There does not appear to be any special need for this property
such that taking it is the only way to effectuate the government's
goals.6
However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a very
expansive definition of public use. The Court has proclaimed that
"where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Pubic Use Clause." 7
Hence a taking is for a public use so long as the legislature had a
reasonable belief that exercise of the takings power would benefit the
public, and it had a rational basis for its belief."

83. Thomson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937); see also Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447 (1930); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Neb., 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896).
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 662.
85. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN

UNION 715-16 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890).
86. An example of a valid special need would be something like a plot of land
standing in the way of completion of a public highway.
87. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citing generally Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
88. See Joseph Sax, Takings and the PolicePower, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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This definition is broad enough to swallow the public use
requirement. The California statute is intended to help individual
artists realize the benefits of their individual fame. It cannot be said
rationally that its ultimate goal is to help promote up-and-coming
artists because the benefit can only realized once the artist achieves
enough fame for the works to increase in price. In fact, the most
recent data shows that in the United States, resale rights benefit only
a few established artists.89 The top twenty-percent of all eligible
artists would stand to collect over ninety-five percent of all royalties,
with the top five artists collecting over fifty-five percent of all possible
resale royalties. 0 The artists themselves are aware of the limited
effect resale royalty laws have on developing artists,91 and the
concentration of resale royalties in the hands of the successful fails to
benefit new artists in their climb to fame.
Worse than the fact that this law only helps established artists is
the fact that it may actually hurt the chances of up-and-coming artists
to get the exposure needed for eventual fame. The art market has
two major sectors: (1) the "primary market," which is comprised of
the first sale from the artist; and (2) "the secondary market," or resale
market." The Resale Royalty Act by its terms applies only to
transactions that take place in the secondary market. The secondary
market is more discriminating than the primary market. Of the
hundreds of thousands of working artists in the United States, only
perhaps two or three hundred have a significant secondary market. 94
[These are the] elite of artists who have already succeeded, who
are recognized by critics and art historians, whose works have
entered major private collections and are acquired by leading
89. See generally Jeffrey C. Wu, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: A
Follow-Up Study, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 531, 543 (1999).
90. See id. at 543-45 (noting the wide discrepancy between the artists in the top
twenty percent who would have received a median royalty of over one-thousand dollars a
month versus the next twenty percent who would have received just over one-hundred
dollars a month. The language "would have" is used, because in fact most artists do not
know about this Act and thus do not collect.).
91. See David Hockney, Michael Craig-Martin, Sir Howard Hodgkin, Anthony
Green, Ian Davenport, Gillian Ayres, Letter to the Editor, Resale Right is Wrong for Art,
TIMES (London), January 21, 2006.
92. John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J.
COMP. L. 103, 105 (1993).
93. Id. at 106.
94. See Tome R. Camp, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An Empirical
Study, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC. U.S.A. 146 (1980).
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museums, who are the subjects of articles in ARTnews and Art
in America, whose works are in demand and sell for high prices
on the primary market: The Rauschenbergs, Lichtensteins,
Hockneys, Johnses, Stellas, Frankenthalers, Diebenkorns, and a
few score others. Their art world success correlates with their
market success; they have a secondary market because they
have succeeded. 5
Most artists are shut out of the secondary market by simple
economics; "secondary market dealers do not accept their works for
resale because they know from experience that such works are
unlikely to resell at any price, and the few that [do] sell w[ill] bring
[royalties] too small to cover the expense of sale." 6 Resale royalties,
such as the mandatory five-percent found in California's Resale
Royalty Act, will only increase the risk that secondary market sellers
will face diminished profits upon resale.9 As the primary actors in
the resale or secondary market, auction houses are reluctant to take a
chance on reselling art which is unlikely to cover the expense of sale.98
This increased risk based upon the possibility of a decreased return
magnifies the effect on the resale of less-established artists, in effect
shutting new artists out of the resale market.' This phenomenon
negates the desired effect of the California law, as less established
artists face a diminished number of actors willing to take a chance on
selling their works and creating a secondary market where the value
of their works will increase.'?
Thus I would argue that armed with even a rudimentary
knowledge of the art market, the legislature could not rationally
believe this law would have the effect of helping new artists generally
or promoting fledgling artists. It will only help, and has only helped,
those artists with substantial secondary markets. Although stories
can be invented as to how the California Resale Royalty Act serves a
public purpose under the Supreme Court's broad definition, it is hard
to imagine a more non-public use than a mandated person-to-person

95. Merryman, supra note 92, at 106-07.
96. Id. at 107.
97. See Gordon P. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The
Case of the Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200, 220-21 (1978) (explaining the
paradox between the droit de suite's goal of creating an economic incentive for artists and
its opposing effect of decreasing investment in new artists).
98. Merryman, supra note 92, at 107.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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transaction that benefits only the individual, already successful, artist.
If this exercise of police power is considered a valid public use, then
the public use prong of the Fifth Amendment has truly lost its teeth.
However, answering whether or not the mandated five-percent
royalty to artists under the California Resale Royalty Act amounts to
a public use merely settles the question of whether the government
can take the property. The owner of property validly taken for a
public use must still be justly compensated. Thus the outcome of this
prong is non-determinative for an analysis showing that just
compensation is required. It does, however, highlight just how out of
step the Act is with our classical conceptions of legislative power and
may show that this is a wholly invalid taking, incurable by
compensation.
E.

What Is the Requirement for 'Just Compensation?'

Once it has been determined that a taking has occurred and that
the thing taken was "property" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, a court must measure the amount the government must
pay to effectuate "just compensation." Justice Oliver Wendell
Homes declared long ago that the measure is "what has the owner
lost, not what has the taker gained."o' The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled in accordance with this reasoning, that just
compensation is measured in terms of loss to the owner; the gain to
the taker is irrelevant. The value of the loss is assessed in terms of
market value to the ownerm as of the time of the taking.o3
Thus it matters not that the California government receives none
of the five-percent royalty. The only consideration is how much was
lost by the seller forced to pay this five-percent. In the case of all
sellers for whom the mandatory five-percent royalty did not inhere in
their title, just compensation then will be equivalent to the sum they
are required to pay to the artist. This sum is the market value of what
they have lost at the time of the taking. Therefore, in those instances
in which the California Resale Royalty Act requires a seller to pay
the artist a five-percent royalty, the State of California must
reimburse the seller for this expense unless the artist's royalty inhered
in the seller's title.

101. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
102. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
103. See Kirby Forrest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
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IV. Suggested Changes
This need to reimburse the seller can be avoided if California
rewrites the statute such that it falls under the rubric of a tax. Taxes
are takings, but as explained above, they do not require explicit
compensation because this would render the taxing power useless, as
upon collection, a government would immediately have to repay the
taxed amount. If this Resale Royalty Act were written instead as an
amendment to the tax code, the legislature's goals could be achieved
without the necessity of paying compensation for the taking and could
likely effectuate their intent more successfully.
The statute should be amended such that it takes only a
percentage of the profit, not a percentage of the sale price. This will
omit the current possibility of the 100% "Bill Gates tax" described
previously. Secondly, the statute should be written in a way that
rationally relates to the legislature's stated goals. If the true goal of
this statute is to protect the starving artist, perhaps the tax should be
used to fund grants for new artists. A sales tax on fine art that went
to a state fund designated for promotion of the arts would assuredly
satisfy the requirements for a valid tax and alleviate the need to
reimburse the sellers.
Conclusion
The California Resale Royalty Act mandates that a seller give
five-percent of the sale price of a work of art to its artist, whenever a
work of art is sold in California or by a California resident. As the
Resale Royalty Act applies to all transactions, without regard for the
likelihood that the mandatory five-percent royalty never inhered in
the owner's title, the statute effects a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, as applied in the majority of cases, and the government
must pay just compensation. It is possible that compensation alone
may not be enough to bring this statute in line with the Constitution,
because the taking is arguably not for public use as it seems to bear
no rational relationship to the legislature's stated goals. In that case,
just compensation will not cure the statute's constitutional
deficiencies, and the property must be returned to the owner.
Irrespective of its constitutionality, the Resale Royalty Act does not
appear to be helping most artists and may in fact be hurting them by
decreasing the likelihood of secondary market sellers carrying their
pieces. Thus for both constitutional and policy reasons, the California
Resale Royalty Act should be repealed or rewritten in such a way
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that it would comply with the Constitution and achieve the
legislature's goals.

